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Torture, Removal, and the Rule of Noninquiry
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INTRODUCTION
This Comment argues against extending the rule of noninquiry from extra-
dition to removal cases. In removal cases where potential torture is alleged,
courts should review removal determinations under a standard deferential to
the executive.
The rule of noninquiry precludes U.S. courts from assessing to any degree
the institutions and processes of foreign governments in extradition cases to de-
termine "the possibility that the [deportee] will be mistreated ... in [the desti-
nation] country."' Extradition involves the "official surrender of an alleged
criminal by one state or nation to another having jurisdiction over the crime
charged [or] the return of a fugitive from justice, regardless of consent, by the
authorities where the fugitive is found."2 Removal, formerly called deportation,
is the process through which the United States forces departure of non-citizens
from the country and does not necessarily involve transfer directly to a foreign
law enforcement agency.4 Until now, courts have applied the rule of noninquiry
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1. Jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts, the Constitution, and the Rule of Non-Inquiry
in International Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1198, 1198 (1991); see
Kent Wellington, Note, Extradition: A Fair and Effective Weapon in the War on
Terrorism, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1447, 1448 (199o). This Comment focuses on removal,
and the term "deportee" is used to refer to the person challenging removal for the
sake of simplicity.
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 623 (8th ed. 2004).
3. Daniel Kanstroom, Post-Deportation Human Rights Law: Aspiration, Oxymoron, or
Necessity?, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 195, 195 (2007).
4. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, § 440, 11o Stat. 1214, 1276-79 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C.).
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in extradition cases but have not extended it to removal cases. From 2001 to
2004, over seven hundred thousand people were formally removed from the
United States.' If courts were to extend noninquiry to removal contexts, the
United States could be implicated inappropriately in mistreatment by foreign
governments of deportees. This issue is particularly timely since diplomatic as-
surances of nontorture will be employed extensively in the transfer of detainees
from Guantdnamo Bay to other countries.6
The Third Circuit recently addressed the rule of noninquiry in the removal
context in Khouzam v. Chertoff7 The Khouzam panel held that the rule of non-
inquiry did not apply in removal cases, at least when a potential deportee raises
a claim under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). The Khouzam
court explicitly distinguished its holding from the recent Supreme Court deci-
sion in Munaf v. Geren,s which Khouzam described as "arguably extend[ing]"
the rule of noninquiry to some removal cases, but not those cases involving po-
tential deportees' CAT claims. 9
This Comment argues that Khouzam misconstrued Munaf and that the Su-
preme Court did not extend the rule of noninquiry to removal cases in Munaf
Rather, both Munaf and Khouzam involved judicial review of the likelihood of
torture upon transfer. The rule of noninquiry has thus not been extended to
removal. This Comment opposes use of the noninquiry rule in removal cases.
The rule of noninquiry is founded largely on notions of comity, yet other coun-
tries do not employ the rule of noninquiry in removal cases. It is ironic to base a
rule on comity when the rule is not followed by other nations.
This Comment is divided into four parts. Part I details the facts of Khou-
zam and the Third Circuit's contention that Munaf extended the rule of nonin-
quiry to non-CAT removal situations. Part II argues that the Third Circuit mis-
read Munaf and that Munaf did not extend the rule of noninquiry to removal
cases. Rather, Munaf allowed for examination of executive removal decisions
5- OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2004
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 159 (2006).
6. Human Rights Watch, EU Should Help Close Guantanamo by Resettling Detain-
ees (Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/04/28/eu-should-help-
close-guantanamo-resettling-detainees. Guantinamo Bay detainees likely will be
transferred rather than removed. The construction of the rule of noninquiry in
the removal and extradition contexts, however, will inform courts' decisions in
transfer cases. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 514-17 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (exam-
ining and dismissing the claims of potential torture brought by Uighurs who were
to be transferred from Guantdnamo Bay on the ground that the CAT had not
been invoked and that such transfers were subject to the rule of noninquiry under
Munafl.
7. 549 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 20o8).
8. 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008).




under a deferential standard. Part III examines foreign precedent and argues
that, given the rule of noninquiry's frequent justification on comity grounds,
the practices of foreign courts have persuasive weight. The decisions of these
courts, combined with the opinions in Munaf, support deferential judicial re-
view of executive determinations in removal contexts regarding diplomatic as-
surances not to torture, rather than a rule of complete judicial noninquiry. The
Comment concludes by discussing the critical role the rule of noninquiry will
play in the Obama Administration's plan to close Guant~namo Bay.
I. THE FACTS OF KHOUZAM
On February lo, 1998, Sami Khouzam boarded a plane in Egypt bound for
New York City." Khouzam, a Coptic Christian who worked as an accountant in
Egypt, held a multiple-entry visa to the United States." While Khouzam's plane
was airborne, the Egyptian government informed U.S. authorities that Khou-
zam was wanted in connection with a murder committed in Cairo. 2 U.S. offi-
cials detained Khouzam immediately upon his arrival and initiated removal
procedures to return him to Egypt. 3 Khouzam sought asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under CAT.'
4
In Khouzam v. Ashcroft, the Second Circuit granted Khouzam's petition for
withholding removal. While the court found that there were "serious reasons"
to believe Khouzam had committed the homicide for which he was wanted,'6 it
nevertheless concluded that Khouzam was entitled to relief under CAT because
of "'overwhelming' evidence that [he] would be subjected to torture in Egypt."'
7
Khouzam eventually was released into the United States on the condition that
he report regularly to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE). s
10. Id. at 239; Neela Banerjee, Coptic Christian Fights Deportation to Egypt, Fearing
Torture, N.Y. TIMEs, June 6, 2007, at A16.
11. Banerjee, supra note lo.
12. Michael Matza, Phila. Court Blocks Deporting Egyptian, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 6,
2008, at A6. It is unclear on the face of the opinions, pleadings, and related media
coverage why Egypt did not move to extradite Khouzam at a later point, pre-
sumably after charges would have been filed.
13. Khouzam, 549 F.3 d at 235.
14. Id. For the full text of the CAT, see Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. io, 1984, 102 Stat. 382,
1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
15. 361 F.3 d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2004).
16. Id. at 166.
17. Khouzam, 549 F.3d at 239 (quoting Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d at 166).
18. Id. at 240.
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On May 20, 2008, Khouzam reported to ICE and immediately was taken in-
to custody and told that he was "subject to imminent deportation."'9 Khou-
zam's counsel received a letter from an ICE official declaring that there were
"sufficiently reliable diplomatic assurances received by the Department of State
from the government of Egypt that.. . Mr. Khouzam, would not be tortured if
removed" and that the Secretary of Homeland Security was therefore removing
Khouzam to Egypt immediately." Khouzam filed both an emergency petition
for habeas corpus in the district court and a petition for review with the Third
Circuit, alleging that Egypt's diplomatic assurances were insufficient to prevent
him from being tortured upon his return there. 1
In Khouzam v. Chertoff, the government argued that Khouzam's case was
nonjusticiable because of the "rule of noninquiry." Noninquiry "bars courts
from evaluating the fairness and humaneness of another country's criminal jus-
tice system, requiring deference to the Executive Branch on such matters."2
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Rendell rejected this argument. She
noted that the rule of noninquiry has "traditionally been applied only in the ex-
tradition context," not in the case of removals. 3 However, Judge Rendell noted
that the Supreme Court "arguably extended the rule of noninquiry beyond the
extradition context.., without referring to the doctrine by name" in a case de-
cided earlier in 2008, Munaf v. Geren.14 Judge Rendell contended that Chief Jus-
tice Roberts invoked the rule in substance, if not in name, when she concluded
that, "[tihe Judiciary is not suited to second-guess such determinations -
determinations that would require federal courts to pass judgment on foreign
justice systems and undermine the Government's ability to speak with one voice
in this area. 25
The Third Circuit then distinguished Khouzam from Munaf on the grounds
that Munaf did not "properly raise[] a claim for relief under CAT,"26 while
Khouzam did. Khouzam's case therefore was justiciable, while Munaf's was
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 241.
22. Id. at 253 (citing Hoxha v. Levi, 465 F.3d 554, 563 (3d Cir. 20o6)).
23. Id. at 253 (citing Mironescu v. Costner, 48o F.3d 664, 668-70 ( 4th Cir. 2007); Hox-
ha, 465 F.3d at 563; Prasoprat v. Benov, 421 F.3d 1oo9, 16 (9th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 11o F.3d 103, 111 (1st Cir. 1997); In re Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 714
(9th Cir. 1995); In re Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1329 & n.6 (1st Cir. 1993); In re Manzi,
888 F.2d 204, 2o6 (ist Cir. 1989)).
24. Id. at 254. Munaf concerned the habeas petitions brought by two dual American
citizens held by multinational forces in Iraq, who were contesting their transfer to
Iraqi authorities. The Court held that, while habeas applied to the petitioners, it
could afford them no relief. Munafv. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2213-14 (2008).
25. Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2226 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison)).




not. 7 The appeals court was unconvinced by the assurances of the Egyptian
government that Khouzam would not be tortured if returned to Egypt, and
Khouzam's "termination of deferral of removal"2s was therefore vacated.
29
II. REREADING MUNAF
The Third Circuit misinterpreted Munaf. Rather than extend the rule of
noninquiry to removal cases, Munaf assessed the possibility of torture to the
deportee on a standard deferential to the executive. Munaf and Khouzam both
addressed the potential for torture in the removal context, but the actual likeli-
hood of torture in Khouzam's case was much greater than in Munaf's.
Justice Souter's concurrence explicitly preserved inquiry in removal pro-
ceedings: "[N]othing in today's opinion should be read as foreclosing relief for
a citizen of the United States who resists transfer, say, from the American mili-
tary to a foreign government... [where] the probability of torture is well do-
cumented, even if the Executive fails to acknowledge it."3" Justice Souter further
stated that the right to be free from torture is so compelling that a remedy other
than habeas might be crafted to secure the safety of persons threatened by the
possibility of torture on removal.3 Thus, Justice Souter, as well as Justices Brey-
er and Ginsburg who joined his concurrence, explicitly understood Munaf not
as expanding the rule of noninquiry to removal cases, but rather as a case about
proof. The likelihood of torture was not proven in that particular factual cir-
cumstance.
Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion reinforces the interpretation that,
as an evidentiary matter, Munaf failed to demonstrate the likelihood of his tor-
ture upon removal. Chief Justice Roberts declared that: "Petitioners briefly ar-
gue that their claims of potential torture may not be readily dismissed.... "3 2
Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts stated: "Petitioners here allege only the possibil-
ity of mistreatment in a prison facility; this is not a more extreme case in which
the Executive has determined that a detainee is likely to be tortured but decides
to transfer him anyway."" Thus, Chief Justice Roberts left open the possibility
that courts could review the removal decisions made by the executive in more
egregious situations.
27. Id. Judge Rendell also noted that Munaf presented a highly unusual factual sce-
nario.
28. Id. at 248.
29. Id. at 259-60.
30. Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2228.
31. Id. at 2228.
32. Id. at 2226 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 2207.
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Although Chief Justice Roberts did mention the need for the government to
speak with "one voice,"3 4 he nevertheless did not rule out the potential for judi-
cial review of diplomatic assurances of good treatment upon removal. Indeed,
he was careful to note that the Court was not discussing a well-pleaded torture
complaint, further emphasizing the relative weakness of Munaf s allegations of
potential torture.
35
Reading Chief Justice Roberts's opinion as categorically extending the rule
of noninquiry to non-CAT removal claims (as the Khouzam court does) creates
an untenable tension in Chief Justice Roberts's analysis. A court's competence
to assess the "practices in foreign countries" 36 does not increase when a peti-
tioner invokes CAT. Similarly, a court's competence to "determine national
policy" 37 does not vary depending upon the plaintiffs assertion of a CAT claim.
Whether the plaintiffs claims against removal rest on CAT or the Fifth
Amendment, courts assessing the validity of diplomatic assurances of nontor-
ture still must "pass judgment on foreign justice systems and undermine the
Government's ability to speak with one voice." 8 Thus, the Khouzam court's dis-
tinction between CAT and non-CAT claims deprives the Munaf majority hold-
ing of logical coherence. Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts's discussion of the fac-
tually weak case for torture presented by Munaf, combined with Justice Souter's
concurrence, supports the view that the quality of proof offered by Munaf, ra-
ther than the nature of his claim, was dispositive. Chief Justice Roberts avoided
discussing the potential outcome of a well-pleaded removal case with a high po-
tential for torture, while Justice Souter affirmatively asserted that, in such a
case, the Court would review diplomatic assurances that the deportee would be
treated properly upon his return.
The holdings in Khouzam and Munaf are thus reconcilable. In the final
analysis, neither case is controlled by the rule of noninquiry, and thus the rule
has not been expanded to removal cases. The difference in the two outcomes
reflects Munaf s mere allegation of the possibility of torture without providing
substantial evidence versus Khouzam's clear and convincing proof regarding
the likelihood of torture upon his removal to Egypt.
This reading of Munaf and Khouzam as rejecting the rule of noninquiry in
removal cases is consistent with foreign jurisprudence. The next Part shows
strong support in foreign jurisdictions for reading Munaf as not extending the
rule of noninquiry to removal settings. In particular, foreign courts apply a def-
erential standard of review to executive acceptances of diplomatic assurances
not to torture in removal cases.
34. Id. at 2226.
35. Id. at 2225.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2226.
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III. FOREIGN PRECEDENTIAL SUPPORT FOR REREADING MUNAF
The role that foreign precedent should play in domestic decisions is a mat-
ter of heated and ongoing debate.39 For some jurists, references to foreign law
are anathema to basic democratic values.4° For others, foreign law, while not
controlling, can provide compelling arguments for domestic courts.41 In the
case of removal, deference to foreign decisions regarding the rule of noninquiry
is particularly justified, because the rule itself is largely animated by principles
of international comity, obligations under international treaties, and pragmatic
policy foreign concerns. Foreign decisions about removal support this Com-
ment's interpretation of Munaf as a fact-based decision, not an expansion of the
rule of noninquiry to removal cases.
Supporters of the rule of noninquiry argue that "the interests of interna-
tional comity are ill served" by judicial inquiry into the procedures and assur-
ances of foreign countries. 42 At the core of international comity is the "principle
of deference to foreign law and foreign courts."43 It would be ironic for the
United States to propound a rule of international comity-the rule of nonin-
quiry in removal contexts-that is not shared by the rest of the world.44 Indeed,
even in the extradition context, the rule of noninquiry virtually is unique to the
United States. 45 In contrast, the norm against torture is jus cogens, which is in-
39. See Timothy K. Kuhner, The Foreign Source Doctrine: Explaining the Role of For-
eign and International Law in Interpreting the Constitution, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1389,
1390 (2007).
40. Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court & Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Jus-
tice, U.S. Supreme Court, Debate on Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court
Decisions at American University, Washington College of Law (Feb. 25, 2005)
(transcript available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1352357/posts).
41. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Ginsburg Shares Views on Influence of Foreign Law on Her
Court, and Vice Versa, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2009, at A14 (quoting Justice Ginsburg
as saying: "I frankly don't understand all the brouhaha lately from Congress and
even from some of my colleagues about referring to foreign law.").
42. Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1o63, 1067 (2d Cir. 1990), stay denied, 497 U.S. 1054
(199o) (holding that the Secretary of State alone should entertain potential claims
of mistreatment upon extradition).
43. Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 19, 20 (2008) (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-66 (1895)).
44. John Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry and Human Rights Treaties, 45 CATH. U. L.
REV. 1213, 1248 (1996) ("The federal rule of non-inquiry was consistent with inter-
national practice at the time it was developed. Today, however, it is at odds with
international practice and as such has been repudiated by the international com-
munity.").
45. Id.
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cumbent on all societies. 46 It is illogical for the United States to extend a rule on
foreign comity grounds when foreign courts do not have such a rule.
The second justification for the rule of noninquiry is treaty obligation.
47
The Supreme Court has held that, when interpreting treaties, "the opinions of
our sister signatories [are] entitled to considerable weight."' From this prem-
ise, U.S. courts should look to foreign opinions when the rule of noninquiry
arises in a treaty context. No CAT signatory permits removal without affording
the transferee the ability to challenge the validity of diplomatic assurances that
he will not be tortured upon return to his home country.
49
Finally, supporters of the rule of noninquiry argue that the nation should
"speak with one voice" in foreign affairs." Contradictory pronouncements
from different branches of government will produce conflicting messages to
diplomatic partners that may undermine the future credibility of U.S. negotia-
tors. Foreign precedent is useful in evaluating this prudential argument empiri-
cally. If, in relevant contexts, other nations can conduct foreign relations ade-
quately without the rule of noninquiry, then the United States likely can do so
as well.51
Two high courts in jurisdictions with similar legal structures to the United
States-Canada and the European Court of Human Rights-have addressed
cases with nearly identical facts to Khouzam. Their decisions further support
interpreting Munaf as permitting inquiry into the potential for torture in all
removal cases, even when CAT claims are not raised. In 2006, a Canadian court
46. See, e.g., Khouzam v. Hogan, 529 F. Supp. 2d 543, 564 (M.D. Pa. 2008) ("[T]he
right to be free from torture is jus cogens.").
47. Semmelman, supra note I, at 1221-22.
48. Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985) (quoting Benjamins v. British European
Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 919 (2d Cir. 1978)).
49. Declaration of Julia Hall at 2, Khouzam v. Hogan, 529 F. Supp. 2d 543 (M.D. Pa.
20o8) (No. 3:CV-o 7 -o 9 9 2), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
relatedmaterial/khouzamo8o7.pdf ("To the best of my knowledge, no other
country that has absolute nonrefoulement obligations under the Convention
Against Torture or a similar treaty instrument... transfers a person at risk of tor-
ture without permitting him to challenge that transfer before and independent,
impartial body."). For a further breakdown of the jurisprudence of foreign na-
tions, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STILL AT RISK: DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES No
SAFEGUARD AGAINST TORTURE (2005), http://www.hrw.org/en/node/u783/
section/i.
50. Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2226 (2008) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 42
(James Madison)).
51. It is difficult to appraise the impact of the lack of the rule on a foreign country's
ability to speak with one voice, but there does not appear to be a country that has
been adversely impacted by the lack of the rule. Indeed, the U.S. government does
not cite any examples in its brief in Khouzam. See Brief for the Respondents,




held in Mahjoub v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration"2 that Egypt's dip-
lomatic assurances of good treatment were insufficient to support transferring
the plaintiff back to that nation. In 2008, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) in Ismoilov v. Russia53 similarly ruled that diplomatic assurances of
nontorture given by Uzbekistan were insufficient to support removal. These
rulings display willingness by courts of American allies in the international sys-
tem to examine the affairs of other nations when the jus cogens violation of tor-
ture is alleged.
These foreign decisions help resolve a question left open in both Munaf and
Khouzam: What is the appropriate level of review of executive diplomatic assur-
ances in the removal context? Justice Souter's Munaf concurrence, combined
with foreign precedent, supports deferential review of executive acceptances of
diplomatic assurances not to torture. Justice Souter indicated that the Munaf
plaintiff did not prove a sufficiently high "probability of torture" 4 to counteract
the executive's determination that he would not be mistreated upon removal.
Similarly, the Canadian Supreme Court declared that it would take a "deferen-
tial approach" to these questions regarding assurances not to torture and inter-
vene to "set aside [the Executive's decision] only if it is patently unreason-
able.""5 In Ismoilov, the ECHR found that there were "substantial grounds for
believing that [the extraditee] would be in danger of being subjected to tor-
ture" 6 and therefore was "not persuaded that the assurances from the Uzbek
authorities offered a reliable guarantee against the risk of ill-treatment."1
7
While these cases do not employ precisely the same standard, they point to
a deferential review of the executive's determination that it has received reliable
assurances that a deportee would not be mistreated. The Canadian Court ex-
plicitly takes a "deferential approach" to such determinations, while the ECHR
looked to a "substantial ground" framework. Taking a similar approach, United
States courts should respect the executive's leading role in foreign affairs while
allowing for a deferential review to preserve deportees' fundamental rights and
comply with notions of international comity. Such deference would allay Chief
Justice Robert's concern that the Court would interfere in the realm of foreign
affairs traditionally left to the executive by examining the possible torture of
deportees.
52. [2006] 4 F.C.R. 247 (Can.).




54. Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2228.
55. Mahjoub, 4 F.C.R. at 248.
56. Ismoilov, 68.
57. Id. 127.
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In sum, these recent decisions, coupled with the practices of all CAT signa-
tories and the opinions of Justice Souter and Chief Justice Roberts, support
reading Munaf to allow for deferential inquiry into executive branch determina-
tions regarding torture in the removal cases, rather than no inquiry at all.
CONCLUSION
As the Obama White House seeks to close Guantinamo Bay, "persuading
other countries to accept detainees" has become a critical element of the Ad-
ministration's plan." Approximately fifty to sixty of these detainees face no
criminal charges and "have told their lawyers that they fear torture in their
home countries and do not want to be returned there."59 The United States "has
acknowledged that it relies on [diplomatic assurances] for all transfers from
Guantdnamo. ' '6 ° The content of these assurances almost always is kept secret,
even from the person to whom they refer.6'
Fears of torture hardly are idle. In 2004, the United States secured
diplomatic assurance from Syria that a detainee, Maher Arar, would not be
tortured upon his return to the Middle East.6 2 Arar contends that he
nevertheless was severely tortured upon return to Syria, and he currently is
pursuing a civil remedy.6" There is increasing pressure on the Obama
Administration to honor its pledge to close Guantinamo by January 2010. Thus,
the Administration likely will obtain guarantees of nontorture like those at issue
in Arar v. Ashcroft a and find itself facing similar allegations to those raised in
Khouzam. Moreover, as Khouzam shows, the risk of torture is not limited to
Guantdnamo detainees.
Some might argue that the impact of deferential review for all noninquiry
claims would be limited since Khouzam allows for review of CAT claims in re-
moval cases. Under that theory, the Third Circuit's interpretation of Munaf is of
58. William Glaberson & Mark Landler, Top Diplomat To Be Named Special Envoy on
Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2009, at A18.
59. Human Rights Watch, EU Should Help Close Guantanamo by Resettling Detain-
ees (Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/o4/28/eu-should-help-
close-guantanamo-resettling-detainees.
6o. Press Release, ACLU, Documents Reveal U.S. Knowingly Transfers Detainees to
Countries That Torture (Nov. 18, 20o8), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/
37805prs20o818.html (emphasis added).
61. Id.
62. Human Rights Watch, Terrorism Suspects Sent Back to Countries Which Torture
(Apr. 14, 2004), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/04/14/terrorism-suspects-sent-
back-countries-torture.
63. Owen Fiss, The Example of America, 119 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 1 (2009),
http://yalelawjournal.org/content/view/764/1/.
64. Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008).
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little practical significance, since potential deportees need only frame their
claims properly by invoking CAT. This argument is incorrect for two reasons.
First, Khouzam is only the law of the Third Circuit, while Munaf binds the
country. Second, there is an underlying tension in Khouzam that is unresolved
by the Third Circuit's reading of Munaf. Khouzam provides no convincing basis
for distinguishing between CAT and non-CAT removal claims. As a logical
matter, concerns of competence and judicial interference apply regardless of
whether or not a plaintiff invokes CAT in his effort to remain in the United
States. Thus, the review standard in Khouzam stands on weak ground and may
not be sustained by the Supreme Court or in the other circuits.
Diplomatic assurances against torture in removal cases likely will play a
continuing and important role in the future of American policy. If these assur-
ances are challenged judicially, courts should review them using a standard def-
erential to the executive rather than undertaking no inquiry at all. Such defer-
ential review is consistent with Munaf, Khouzam, and foreign precedent. Munaf
should be read to support judicial inquiry into the potential for torture, under a
standard deferential to the executive trying to remove the potential deportee.

